ABSTRACT Considering the scenario of an electronic personal health record system, we put forward a new cryptographic concept called searchable attribute-based signcryption, which can support fine-grained access control, data privacy, data authenticity, and data searchability. Then, we establish the security models and construct a searchable attribute-based signcryption scheme with hybrid access policy. According to the proposed security model frameworks, our scheme is proven to achieve: 1) ciphertext indistinguishability under the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent hardness assumption; 2) existential unforgeability based on the hardness assumption of computational Diffie-Hellman exponent problem; 3) selective security against chosen-keyword attack under the static assumption in the generic group model; and 4) keyword secrecy based on the one-way hardness of hash function. Furthermore, the experimental results show that the proposed scheme is efficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic personal health record (ePHR) is a collection of individual's health related information, which is created and managed by himself. In recent years, there has been enthusiasm in discuss centering the adoption of electronic personal health record systems for patients. The use of electronic personal health record will bring many benefits for human. For example, there are a large number of reliable health information, data and knowledge in electronic personal health record, and then patients can rely on cloud that can easily mange and monitor their health. Electronic personal health record can also offer a constant connection between patients and doctors, which greatly reduces the time to solve problems. Despite of various advantages, the electronic personal health record data includes much sensitive information. It is necessary to design a system that storage and access to electronic personal health record securely.
With the development of cloud computing, many data owners store their data in the cloud server for simplifying local IT management and reducing the cost. As an important application of cloud computing, electronic personal health record system [1] can store, control and share electronic personal health record with some specified users, including doctors, nurses and family members etc. Although the electronic personal health record system can provide many efficient services, outsourcing electronic personal health record to the third-party cloud server will bring security and privacy concerns. Therefore, it is essential to encrypt sensitive electronic personal health record before uploading them to the remote server.
Traditional public key encryption technology can protect the confidentiality of data. But it provides ''one-to-one'' mapping, which implies only single user can access. Both the efficiency and flexibility are limited. Thus, as a kind of ''oneto-many'' public key encryption, attribute-based encryption can solve this problem. So, attribute-based encryption is considered as one of the most appropriate encryption technology for the electronic personal health record system in the cloud computing.
Sahai and Waters [2] first introduced the concept of attribute-based encryption, and proposed a concrete attribute-based encryption scheme, which only supports threshold access policy. In order to support more flexible access policy, in 2006, Goyal et al. [3] first presented the key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE). In KP-ABE, the decryption key is associated with the access control policy and ciphertext is associated with attributes. Thus, it is more suitable for inquiry service, such as audit log and pay-TV system etc. On the contrary, if ciphertext is associated with the access control policy and the decryption key is associated with attributes, such an attribute-based encryption is called as ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE). So, CP-ABE is more suitable for access control service, such as access of electronic personal health record. Bethencourt et al. [4] proposed the first CP-ABE scheme in 2007. Due to the adaptability of attribute-based encryption to cloud computing, a number of schemes [5] - [7] have been proposed to gain a better expressive, efficiency and security.
Attribute-based encryption provides the data confidentiality and expressive fine-grained access control. However, it is intractable to search electronic personal health record data in the server efficiently. To solve this problem, Song et al. [8] first proposed the concept of searchable encryption, which provides a fundamental approach to search over the encrypted data. Furthermore, Boneh et al. [9] presented the first public key encryption scheme with keyword search scheme, where one can search the encrypted data by a keyword. Since then, a number of searchable public key encryption schemes [10] - [13] have proposed to enrich the search feature of scenarios and improve security and efficiency.
In order to support fine-grained access control, in 2013, Wang et al. [14] constructed a ciphertext-policy attributebased encryption scheme supporting keyword search. In their scheme, data owners encrypt data with an access policy, generate indexes for the corresponding keyword collection, and then outsource them to the cloud server. It is only when authorized users' certificate meets the access policy that they could search and decrypt the encrypted data. Later, in 2014, Zheng et al. [15] first proposed a verifiable attribute-based keyword search scheme and constructed two specific schemes based on the access tree: key-policy attribute-based searchable encryption scheme and ciphertext-policy attribute-based searchable encryption scheme. In the recent years, the study of attribute-based searchable encryption has got great development. Taking into account the more realistic scenario, some schemes [16] - [19] were presented. Nevertheless, the above works can only ensure confidentiality of the data, they cannot provide the authenticity of electronic personal health record in the system. If a malicious attacker gains right to modify the electronic personal health record before an authorized user read it, this immediately rises the safety concern of electronic personal health record. For example, if an attending physician receives a falsified electronic personal health record, he may give a wrong diagnosis or treatment to a patient. For some worse cases, the forged electronic personal health record may facilitate someone to murder the patient. These are very serious threats to the electronic personal health record owner. It is necessary to prove the authenticity of electronic personal health record data.
Signature can provide the authenticity and encryption can guarantee the confidentiality. To achieve this two advantages at the same time, traditional method is ''encrypt-thensign'' or ''sign-then-encrypt''. For reducing the cumulative cost of encryption and signature, in 1997, Zheng [20] first introduced the concept of signcryption, which is a logical incorporation of signature and encryption. Subsequently, in order to ensure fine-grained access control for the data in the cloud and prove data owners' genuineness at the cloud servers, Gagne et al. [21] presented the first attribute-based signcryption (ABSC) scheme. In electronic personal health record scenario, Liu et al. [22] proposed an approach for fine-grained access control and secure sharing of signcrypted data. Au et al. [23] proposed a general scheme for secure sharing of electronic personal health record, and their scheme achieved that the doctors can refer the patients' medical record to specialists for research purposes, whenever they are required. Liu et al. [31] proposed a secure online/offline attribute-based signature scheme for sharing of Mobile Health Records. In order to achieve authentication of electronic personal health record, a number of attribute-based signcryption schemes [24] - [27] have been proposed. So, in electronic personal health record system, it is important to achieve authentication of data. Though these attribute-based signcryption schemes can ensure that data owners share efficiently their encryption data with data users and prove their genuineness at the cloud servers, they cannot take the retrieval of the signcryption data into account.
In practice, it is important to design a scheme that achieve the fine-grained access control for the data, the authenticity of electronic personal health record data at the cloud servers, and the encryption data retrieval. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is few scheme that can realize the three functionalities at the same time.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTION
The main contribution of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a new concept of searchable attribute-based signcryption (SABSC), which can simultaneously achieve expressive fine-grained access control, efficient data retrieval and authentication, and establish its security model.
• We adapte Rao et al.'s ciphertext-policy attribute-based signcryption scheme [28] to an attribute-based signcryption scheme with hybrid access policy. In the adapted scheme, a signing LSSS access structure is used to generate a signature key, which can achieve the functionality of authentication. Then an encryption LSSS access structure is employed to encrypt message and keyword, which can achieve the access control over the encrypted electronic personal health record.
• Furthermore, we embed a search mechanism into the adapted attribute-based signcryption scheme with hybrid access policy, and propose the first searchable attribute-based signcryption scheme, which modifies Zheng et al.'s attribute-based keyword search method [15] (i.e based on an access tree) and supports more expressive access control. In the proposed scheme, an identical secret key is used to generate a trapdoor and decrypt a ciphertext, which can promote the logical combination of the above adapted attribute-based signcryption and attribute-based keyword search schemes. Hence, the cost is significantly reduced than the cumulative cost of signcryption and search.
• The proposed scheme is proven to achieve indistinguishability of data ciphertext, unforgeability of signature, selective encryption access policy secure against chosen-keyword attack and keyword secrecy in the standard model rather than random oracle model [15] .
II. PRELIMINARIES A. BILINEAR PAIRING
Let G 1 , G 2 be two multiplicative (cyclic) groups of prime order p, g be a generator of G 1 , and e be a bilinear map 
There is an oracle to compute e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 [29] . G 1 is known as a generic bilinear group. Let g denote ψ 0 (1), g x denote ψ 0 (x), e(g, g) denote ψ 1 (1) and e(g, g) y denote ψ 1 (y).
C. ACCESS STRUCTURE
Let {P 1 , · · · , P n } be a set of attributes. A collection A ⊆ 2 {P 1 ,··· ,P n } is said to be monotone if ∀B ∈ A with B ⊆ C, then C ∈ A. A (monotone) collection A of non-empty subsets of {P 1 , · · · , P n } can be used to represent an (monotone) access structure [6] , where A ⊆ 2 {P 1 ,··· ,P n } \{∅}. The sets in A are called the authorized sets. Otherwise, the sets are called the unauthorized sets with respect to A. So, an attribute set S satisfies an access structure A if and only if S is an authorized set in A, denoted as S ∈ A.
D. LINEAR SECRET SHARING SCHEME
In this paper, we denote a linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) [6] as an access control policy (M, ρ), where M is considered as an l × n share-generating matrix and ρ maps a row of M into an attribute. A LSSS consists of the following two polynomial time algorithms:
• Distribute((M, ρ), α) This algorithm is used to share secret value α. Firstly, take as input (M, ρ) and α. Secondly, select v 2 , · · · , v n ∈ Z p at random and set
is the i-th row of the matrix M. The share λ ρ(i) belongs to the attribute ρ(i).
• Reconstruct((M , ρ), S) We can recover α from some secret shares by this algorithm. Suppose S ∈ A is an authorized set and I = {i|ρ(i) ∈ S} ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , l}. Taking as input (M, ρ) and S, the algorithm outputs a reconstruction coefficient set
where z ∈ Z * p , the computational w-Diffie-Hellman Exponent (w-CDHE) problem is to output g z w+1 . We say that a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm A has at least advantage ε in solving this problem if
Computational Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption. We say that w-CDHE assumption [28] holds if for any PPT algorithm A, the advantage of A in solving the w-CDHE problem is at most ε. 
, the decisional w-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (w-DBDHE) Problem is to determine whether Z = e g z w+1 , g s or a random element R in G 2 . We say that an algorithm A has at least advantage ε in solving this problem if
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption. We say that the w-DBDHE assumption [28] holds if for any PPT algorithm A, the advantage of A in solving the w-DBDHE problem is at most ε.
III. GENERIC SCHEME AND ITS MODELS A. SYSTEM FRAMEWORK
We consider an electronic personal health record system supporting fine-grained access control over encrypted data, data retrieval and data authentication.
As shown in Fig.1 , the system framework consists of four entities: trusted authority (TA), personal health record owners (PHRO), data users (DU), and cloud server (CS).
• TA: Trusted authority is a global trusted authority.
It is responsible for generating the public parameters needed by the system and the master private key. VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 1. The system framework.
Meanwhile, TA is also in charge of generating data owners' signature key and users' decryption key.
• PHRO: Personal health record owner takes charge of signcrypting her/his personal health data. She/he firstly obtains a signing key from TA according to her/his attributes. Then, She/he selects an encryption access structure to signcrypt her/his personal data and generate corresponding index. Finally, data owner uploads the ciphertext and index to the cloud server.
• DU: Data users are some entities who need to access encrypted personal health data in the cloud server. When they intend to search some data of their interested, they first need to generate a token and send it to the cloud server. Then, with the help of the cloud server, data users complete the data retrieval. Finally, data users check the validity of the returned results and decrypt the valid ciphertext.
• CS: Cloud server is honest-but-curious. It is responsible for storing data owners' ciphertext and providing the data retrieval service for data users.
B. GENERIC SCHEME Let M be a message space, G be an access structure space, U s be a space of signing attributes, and U e be a space of decryption attributes. A generic searchable attribute-based signcryption scheme consists of the following eight algorithms:
• Setup(k)→ (pp, msk): Given a security parameter k, TA creates the public parameters pp and master secret key msk, where msk is owned by TA.
• sExtract(msk, (S, ρ))→ sk (S,ρ) : Taking as input the master secret key msk and a signing access structure (S, ρ) over a set A s ⊂ U s , TA outputs a signing key sk (S,ρ) to a legitimate data owner over a secret channel.
• dExtract(msk, A d )→ sk A d : On input a decryption attribute set A d , TA computes a decryption key sk A d with msk and sends it to the corresponding data user over a secret channel.
• Signcrypt(pp, m, sk (S,ρ) , (D, φ)) → CT : PHRO performs this algorithm to signcrypt a message m ∈ M with the input of a signing key sk (S,ρ) , an encryption access structure (D, φ) and public parameters pp.
• GenIndex((D, φ), pp, kw) → I : PHRO chooses a keyword kw for the message m, encrypts the keyword kw with the input pp, (D, φ), and then sends a keyword index or ciphertext I to CS.
• GenToken(sk A d , pp, kw ) → T : Given a keyword kw of interested, DU executes this algorithm to generate a corresponding token T .
• Search(I , T , CT ) → CT : After gaining the token T , CS firstly matches it with the index I , and then returns the relevant search results CT to DU.
• Unsigncrypt(pp, CT , sk A d ) → m : DU first checks the validity of ciphertext CT . If CT can pass the verification, DU can recover the message m corresponding to CT .
C. SECURITY MODEL
The security of generic scheme is considered from two aspects. On the one hand, the security of the indistinguishability of data ciphertext against selective encryption access policy and chosen-ciphertext attacks [28] and the unforgeability of signature against selective signature attribute set and chosen-message attacks [30] . On the other hand, the security of searchable encryption is composed of the indistinguishability of keyword ciphertext or index against selective encryption access policy and chosen-keyword attacks, and the secrecy of keyword against chosen-token attacks [15] .
1) INDISTINGUISHABILITY OF DATA CIPHERTEXT
We formalize the indistinguishability of data ciphertext against selective encryption access policy and adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks by the following game between a challenger C and an adversary A:
• Init: C gives the space of signature attributes U s and the space of encryption attributes U e . Next, A chooses a challenge encryption access structure (D * , φ * ) and sends it to C.
• Setup: Given the security parameter k, C runs the algorithm Setup(k) to output the public parameters pp, while keeps the master secret key msk to himself.
• Phase 1: A queries the following oracles for polynomially times:
On input a signature access structure (S, ρ), C runs sExtract(msk, (S, ρ)) to generate a signing key sk (S,ρ) and sends it to A.
: Given a message m, an encryption access structure (D, φ), and a signature attribute set A s , C selects a signature access structure (S, ρ) with the restriction A s ∈ (S, ρ) and computes sk (S,ρ) through the algorithm sExtract(msk, (S, ρ)). Finally, he sends a ciphertext CT generated by running the algorithm Signcryption(pp, m, sk (S,ρ) • Challenge: A sends two equal length messages m * 0 , m * 1 and a signature attribute set A * s to C. Then, C chooses a signature access structure (S * , ρ * ) such that A * s ∈ (S * , ρ * ) and runs sExtract(msk, (S * , ρ * )) to generate a signing key sk (S * ,ρ * ) . Finally, C selects b ∈ {0, 1} and returns CT b through the algorithm
• Phase 2: A continues to query the oracles as in Phase 1.
The restriction is that in
• Guess: A returns a guess b ∈ {0, 1}. It wins the game if b = b. The advantage of A in the above game is defined as
Definition 1: A searchable attribute-based signcryption scheme can achieve the ciphertext indistinguishability under selective encryption access policy and chosen-ciphertext attacks adaptively if an adversary A wins the above game with a negligible advantage.
2) UNFORGEABILITY OF SIGNATURE
We formalize the unforgeability of signature against selective signature attribute set and adaptive chosen-message attacks by the following game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
• Init: C gives the space of signature attributes U s and the space of encryption attributes U e . Then, A chooses a signature attribute set A * s and send it to C. • Setup: Given security parameter k, C runs the Setup(k) algorithm to output the public parameter pp and keeps the master secret key msk to himself.
• Phase: A can query the following oracles for many times: -O sE (S, ρ): Given a signature access structure (S, ρ) such that A * s / ∈ (S, ρ), C computes sk (S,ρ) by running sExtract(msk, (S, ρ)) and sends it to A.
: Given a message m, an encryption access structure (D, φ) and a signature attribute set A s , C selects a signature access structure (S, ρ) with the restriction A s ∈ (S, ρ), then obtains sk (S,ρ) by the oracle O sE (S, ρ), and runs Signcrypt(m, pp, sk (S,ρ) , (D, φ)) to generate CT for A. D, A s , φ) ), A wins the game.
The advantage of A in the above game is defined as
Definition 2: A searchable attribute-based signcryption scheme can achieve the unforgeability of signature against selective signature attribute set and adaptive chosen-message attacks if an adversary A wins the above game with a negligible advantage.
3) INDISTINGUISHABILITY OF KEYWORD CIPHERTEXT
We formalize the indistinguishability of keyword ciphertext or index against selective encryption access policy and adaptive chosen-keyword attacks by the following game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
• Init: C gives the space of encryption attribute set U e and adversary A selects a challenged encryption access structure (D * , φ * ) and sends it to the challenger C.
• Setup: Given the security parameter k, C runs the algorithm Setup(k) to output the public parameters pp, while the master secret key msk is owned by himself.
• Phase 1: A queries the following oracles for polynomial times. Meanwhile, C maintains a keyword list L kw , which is empty initially . • Challenge: A sends two equal length keywords kw 0 and kw 1 such that kw 0 , kw 1 / ∈ L kw to C. Then, C randomly picks a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and runs the algorithm GenIndex(pp, (D * , φ * ), kw b ) to generate a keyword index I for A.
• Phase 2: A issues a series of queries as in Phase 1. The restriction is that if
• Guess: A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = b, A wins the game. The advantage of A in breaking the above game is defined as
Definition 3: A searchable attribute-based signcryption scheme can achieve the index indistinguishability under selective encryption access policy and chosen-keyword attacks if an adversary A wins the above game with negligible advantage.
4) KEYWORD SECRECY
Finally, we formalize the secrecy of keyword against adaptive chosen-token attacks by the following game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
• Setup: Given the security parameter k, C runs the algorithm Setup(k) to generate the public parameters pp and master secret key msk.
• Phase: A issues the following queries for polynomial times. Meanwhile, C maintains a keyword list L A d , which is empty initially . • Challenge: A submits a challenge encryption access structure (D * , φ * ) to C. Then, C selects kw * and
• Guess: After issuing q distinct keywords, A outputs a keyword kw and wins the keyword secrecy game if kw = kw * . Definition 4: A searchable attribute-based signcryption scheme can achieve the secrecy of keyword against adaptive chosen-token attacks if the advantage of A in breaking the above keyword secrecy game is at most 1 |M|−|q| + ε, where |q| denotes the number of queried keywords, ε is a negligible probability in security parameter k, and M is the message space.
IV. OUR CONSTRUCTION
By using Rao et al.'s key-policy attribute-based signcrytion scheme [30] and Rao's ciphertext-policy attribute-based signcrytion scheme [28] , and modifying Zheng et al.'s attribute-based keyword search method [15] , we construct a concrete searchable attribute-based signcryption scheme for electronic personal health record system.
A. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
• Setup: Given security parameter k, TA outputs two cyclic groups G 1 , G 2 of a l-bit prime order p, a generator g of G 1 , and a map e :
Let U e = {att x } be the space of decryption attributes, U s = {att x } be the space of signature attributes, and M = {0, 1} l m be the message space, where l m denotes the length of message. TA chooses four one-way, collision-resistant hash
and h x ∈ G 1 for each attribute att x ∈ U e , T x ∈ G 1 for each attribute att x ∈ U s . and sets the public parameters pp and master secret key msk as follows: G 2 , p, e, g, e(g, g) α , v, h 0 , 
Finally, the signing key is set as:
• dExtract: Data user sends a decryption attribute set A d , TA selectsr ∈ Z * p and calculates
where A is used to generate a search token. So, TA sets the decryption key as follows:
• Signcrypt: To signcrypt a message m ∈ {0, 1} l m , the signcryptor selects an authorized signature attribute set A s , which satisfies the signature predicate (S, ρ). Thus, data owner can find a coefficient set {w i |i ∈ I s } such that i∈I s
att ρ(i) ∈ A s . Select ζ, θ, ξ ∈ Z * p and a random vector .
According to the encryption access policy (D, φ), where D is an l e × n e matrix and row i (i.e − → D i ) is associated with an attribute φ(i). Then, the data owner computes the following terms:
Finally, a signcryption of m is set as:
• GenIndex: Data owner inputs a keyword kw, picks r ∈ Z * p , and computes
So, a keyword index is set as
• GenToken: Data user inputs an interested keyword kw , selects a random element s ∈ Z * p with a restriction s = 1, and computes
For each att x ∈ A d , the algorithm calculates
A token of keyword kw is set as:
• Search: On input the index I and the token T , CS first checks whether the attribute set A d satisfies the encryption access structure (D, φ) or not. If yes, CS can find a set {w i |i ∈ I e } such that i∈I e
and checks whether the following (1) holds or not.
If (1) holds, CS returns the relevant results to data user. Otherwise, output ⊥.
• DeSigncrypt: On input CT , A s , sk A d , the algorithm first checks whether the decryption attribute set A d satisfies the encryption access structure (D, φ) or not. If not, it returns ⊥. Otherwise, the algorithm computes µ = H 3 (E 1 ),
and checks the validity of CT according to the following equation:
If (2) does not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise, data user decrypts CT as follows. Since A d satisfies (D, φ), data user can find a reconstruction coefficient set {a i |i ∈ I e } such that i∈I e λ φ(i) · a i = ζ , and then obtain e (g, g)
Finally, data user can recover m through
B. CORRECTNESS
In this section, we illustrate the correctness of the above equations.
Correctness of (1)
Therefore, we have
Correctness of (2). When A s satisfies (S, p), there exists
So, [15] , the security of the proposed scheme can be guaranteed through the following four theorems. The detailed proof will be shown in Appendix A-D. Theorem 1: The proposed scheme can achieve ciphertext indistinguishability under selective encryption access policy and chosen-ciphertext attacks based on the hardness assumption of w-DBDHE problem without using any random oracle.
Correctness of (3) Since
Theorem 2: The proposed scheme is unforgeable under selective signature attribute set and adaptive chosen-message attacks based on the hardness assumption of the w-CDHE problem without using the random oracle.
Theorem 3: The proposed scheme can achieve keyword indistinguishability under selective encryption access policy and chosen-keyword attacks in the generic bilinear group model.
Theorem 4:
The proposed scheme can guarantee keyword secrecy in the case of the given one-way hash function H 4 .
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate the efficiency of the proposed SABSC scheme in terms of both computation cost and size in different phase. For convenience, we give some notations in With the decryption key, the data user can run the GenToken algorithm to generate the token, which needs φ d + 5 exponentiation operations to generate φ d + 4 group elements in G 1 . Furthermore, the cloud server searches over the index that the computation cost is 3p bilinear pairing operations and 1 exponentiation operations. Finally, in the DeSigncrypt phase, there only exits 2φ d exponentiation operations. Under the Windows XP environment, we test the efficiency of the proposed scheme based on the PBC Library. The program runs on a laptop computer configured as Genuine, Intel, CPU, TI500@3.40GHZ, and 2GB RAM. In the experiments, the modulus of the elements in the group is chosen to be 512 bits, the number of attributes ranges from 20 to 80. Fig.2 shows that the cost of time and the size of elements change with the increase of attributes. Furthermore, in ePHR system, the number of the attributes is often fewer. In the proposed scheme, when the number of attributes is 80, the maximum time-consuming is about 0.6s. Thus, the experiments show that our solution is efficient and practical in ePHR system.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a new concept of searchable attributebased signcryption and constructed a concrete scheme with hybrid access policy for electronic personal health record system. The proposed scheme is more appealing on account of its supporting for expressive fine-grained access control, data retrieval and authentication. Furthermore, the proposed scheme achieves essential security goals, such as data confidentiality, keyword secrecy, unforgeable and signcryptor privacy. The proof of security is realized in the standard model. In the future, we will do more work to enhance the efficiency of the scheme. Meanwhile, we will do some work that support the size of ciphertext is constant and user revocation, and ciphertext updating.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this phase, the hash functions {H i } 4 i=1 are collision resistant. Assume that the simulator C has a w-DBDHE instance − → y z,ζ , Z ∈ G 2 , where
Then, C attempts to distinguish Z is e g w+1 , g ζ or a random element of G 2 through the following game. C also receives the pairing parameters
In addition, C plays the role of a challenger in the game of the security model and interacts with an adversary A.
• Init: C gives the space of signature attributes U s = {att x }, the space of encryption attributes U e = {att x } and the message space M = {0, 1} l m . Then, the adversary A chooses an encryption access structure (D * , φ * ) and sends it to C, where D * is an l * e × n * e matrix with a row labeling function φ * : l * e → U e and n * e ≤ w.
be the i-th row of the matrix D * .
• Setup: C generates public parameters for A as follows: 1) Select α ∈ Z p and set
by implicitly setting α = α + z w+1 . 2) For each att φ * (i) ∈ U e , select f x ∈ Z * p and set
3) For each att x ∈ U s , choose t 0 , t x ∈ Z p , and
, and compute
• Phase 1: A queries the following oracles for polynomial times.
-O sE (S, ρ): Given a signature LSSS access structure (S, ρ), C generates a signing key sk (S,ρ) for A as follows. Note that C does not know z w+1 and hence the master key α = α + z w+1 , but has the knowledge of α .
· S i,1 that contains the term z w+1 and hence g λ ρ(i) contains g z w+1 = g w+1 , which is unknown to A. 4) Select r i ∈ Z * p and compute
where r i is implicitly set r i = r i − z w · S i,1 . Hence, the signing key
. C computes the decryption key sk A d as follows:
The decryption key
an encryption access structure (D, φ) and a signature attribute set A s ∈ U s , C chooses a signature access structure (S, ρ) such that A s ∈ (S, ρ), runs O sE (S, ρ) to generate a signing key sk (S,ρ) and runs the Signcrypt(pp, m, sk (S,ρ) , (D, φ)) to return A the ciphertext CT . (D, φ) , then runs the DeSgincrypt (CT , sk (D,φ) ) algorithm to return A the message m.
3) Otherwise, C computes µ = H 3 (E 1 ) and sets e(g, g)
4) Finally, the message
is send to A. Note that E 1 = g ζ is random for A, so the probability of E 1 = E * 1 is at most 1 p .
• Challenge: A sends two messages m * 0 , m * 1 ∈ M and a signature attribute set A * s to C. C picks a random bit b * ∈ {0, 1} and signcrypt the message m b * with the input (D * , φ * ) and A * s as follows:
and
where j * i ∈ {0, 1}, for all i ∈ [l].
• Phase 2: A continues to query the oracles as in Phase 1. The restriction is that A cannot query the
• Guess: A returns a guess b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = b, then C can guess that Z = e g w+1 , g ζ in the w-DBDHE instance. Probability analysis: The event is which C aborts the game in when A queries the O DS with the ciphertext satisfying E 1 = E * 1 . The probability of this event happened is at most q DS /p, where q DS is the maximum number of unsigncrypt queries made by adversary. If C dose not abort and Z = e(g w+1 , g ζ ), then C provides perfect simulation and hence
2 . Therefore, the challenger C can solve the w-DBDHE problem with advantage at least ε−(
is not hard, so the adversary cannot attack the scheme successfully.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Given a w-CDHE problem instance
1 , where z ∈ {2, · · · , p − 1} and g is a generator of G 1 . The simulator C attempts to compute g z w+1 though the following game. C plays the role of a challenger and interacts with an adversary A. Here, {H i } 4 i=1 are four one-way, collision resistant hash functions.
• Init: C specifies the encryption attribute space U e = {att x } and the signature attribute space U s = {att x }. Then, A sends a challenge signature set A * s ⊆ U s to C.
• Setup: Given the security parameter k, C generates the public parameters as follows: 1) Sample α ∈ Z * p , and set e (g, g)
) Let ψ = k, where ψ (l + 1) < p and k is the security parameter. Select an integer with the restriction 0 l.
• Phase: A queries the following oracles for many times: -O sE (S, ρ): Given a signature LSSS access structure (S, ρ) such that A * s / ∈ (S, ρ), where S = S i,j l s ×n s . C computes a signing key sk (S,ρ) as follows.
Select τ i ∈ Z p and compute In order to provide a perfect simulation, the game cannot be aborted in Forgery phase. Following [2] , we have
.
Suppose that A wins the game with an advantage ε, C can solve the w-CDHE problem with the advantage ε = ε k(l+1) .
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 3
In the indistinguishability of keyword ciphertext game, an adversary A attempts to distinguish X rH 4 (kw 0 ) and X rH 4 (kw 1 ) . Given a random element ν ∈ Z * p , the probability of distinguishing X rH 4 (kw 0 ) from g ν is the same as that of distinguishing X rH 4 (kw 1 ) from g ν , where X = g α . Therefore, if A can break the game with an advantage ε, then it can distinguish X rH 2 (kw 0 ) from g ν with an advantage ε 2 . Thus, we consider the game in which A can distinguish X rH 4 (kw 0 ) from g ν . The game is shown as follows:
• Init: C gives the encryption attribute space U e = att j .
Then, A chooses a challenge encryption access structure (D * , φ * ) and sends it to C, where D * is an l * e ×n * e matrix.
• Setup: C selects a, b, α, c ∈ Z * p , v ∈ G 1 , then, for each att x ∈ U e , selects f x ∈ Z * p and sets h x = g f x . Finally, C outputs the public parameters e, g, p, g a , g b , g c . YAQING FAN received the B.S. degree from the College of Mathematics and Information Sciences, Taiyuan Normal University, in 2015. She is currently pursuing the master's degree in mathematics with Xidian University. Her research interests include cryptography and cloud security.
